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"ANNEX A"

Conclusions to NIE-72, "Probable Developments in the Union of South Africa," 20 October 1952

1. The strategic importance of the Union of South Africa arises chiefly from its substantial production of chromite, manganese, and amosite asbestos; from its potential production of uranium; and from the fact that in event of general war the Union's bases and port facilities would be valuable, especially if the Suez Canal were closed.

2. We believe that under present conditions the Union will probably remain for at least four years unable to meet its commitment to provide a full armored division for Middle East defense within three months after the outbreak of war. If war should break out now, South Africa could not provide the division in less than one year, even with prompt, substantial, outside material aid.

3. The chief immediate problem in South Africa is the extreme political tension between the Nationalists and the Opposition. Nationalist and Opposition leaders will endeavor to avert civil war, but because they intend to press their positions to the limit, short of such a conflict, and because they may miscalculate their ability to control their followers in inflammable situations, the possibility of civil war cannot be excluded.

4. Over the long run the repressive racial policy of the whites will almost certainly lead to rebellion of the non-white population. Communist influence, presently small, will probably play an increasing part in stimulating unrest.

5. The tensions in South Africa are unlikely for the next several years to interfere seriously with the export of strategic materials, but they may limit the Union's ability to dispatch forces outside the country in event of war. In the longer run, when rising racial tensions erupt into widespread disorders, the outflow of strategic materials will be hampered or even halted.

6. Racial tensions in South Africa will almost certainly have an increasingly adverse effect on race relations elsewhere in Africa and on the relations of India and the rest of Asia with the West. If the UN intensifies its criticisms of the Union's racial policy, the Union may carry out its threat to withdraw from the UN.

NOTE: The third conclusion (and the relevant passage in the discussion) is the only one which, in our opinion, no longer remains useful. We believe that the possibility of armed conflict between organized white groups has virtually disappeared.

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